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Abstract—Intrusion detection has focused primarily on 
detecting cyberattacks at the event-level. Since there is such a large 
volume of network data and attacks are minimal, machine 
learning approaches have focused on improving accuracy and 
reducing false positives, but this has frequently resulted in 
overfitting. In addition, the volume of intrusion detection alerts is 
large and creates fatigue in the human analyst who must review 
them. This research addresses the problems associated with event-
level intrusion detection and the large volumes of intrusion alerts 
by applying active learning and cyber situation awareness.  This 
paper includes the results of two experiments using the UNSW-
NB15 dataset. The first experiment evaluated sampling 
approaches for querying the oracle, as part of active learning. It 
then trained a Random Forest classifier using the samples and 
evaluated its results. The second experiment applied cyber 
situation awareness by aggregating the detection results of the first 
experiment and calculating the probability that a computer system 
was part of a cyberattack. This research showed that moving the 
perspective of event-level alerts to the probability that a computer 
system was part of an attack improved the accuracy of detection 
and reduced the volume of alerts that a human analyst would need 
to review. 
Keywords—intrusion detection, active learning, cyber situation 
awareness, k-means clustering, Random Forest, Bernoulli trial, 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Current machine learning approaches to intrusion detection 
are insufficient for dealing with the problems of uncertain 
results, overfitting, and large volumes of alerts for human review 
[1]. At present, intrusion detection focuses on the observation of 
discrete events to identify cyberattacks, which can be error prone 
and insensitive to novel attacks. When human analysts respond 
to intrusion alerts, they use mental models of cyber situation 
awareness to combine the observations of discrete events and 
create an understanding of the current situation [2]. Once the 
current situation is understood, it is possible to project a future 
state and determine an appropriate course of action. But human 
analysts rely on uncertain information provided by intrusion 
alerts and use their own biases, which can result in bad decisions 
[3]. This problem is compounded by the large volume of events 
that must be analyzed. 
A new approach to intrusion detection is needed to enhance 
decision-making and enable more rapid response to 
cyberattacks. This research addresses the problems associated 
with intrusion detection by applying active learning to support 
cyber situation awareness. This new approach to intrusion 
detection applies machine learning to intrusion detection and is 
supported by probabilistic cyber situation awareness to identify 
the computer systems involved in an attack. This allows 
improved decision-making to identify an appropriate course of 
action. This research demonstrated that high detection accuracy 
at the event-level was unnecessary to predict that a computer 
system was carrying out attacks. Instead of over-training 
detection algorithms, this solution detected novel attacks and 
was more robust against adversarial evasion.  
Using a series of active learning iterations, this research 
classified the UNSW-NB15 intrusion detection dataset to create 
multiple sets of observations. After manually labeling as few as 
160 records, the results demonstrated that by aggregating the 
observations to the source IP address, the algorithm had a high 
degree of accuracy in separating the IP addresses that were 
normal from those that were carrying out cyberattacks. 
This research builds upon prior active learning for intrusion 
detection research [4] in three ways. First, it introduces a new 
approach to query selection for active learning. In the previous 
research, k-means clustering was used for sampling. This 
research introduces k-means clustering with bagging for query 
selection and provides a more detailed comparison of random, 
k-means, and k-means with bagging sampling. Second, this 
research uses a more contemporary dataset for intrusion 
detection. The prior research utilized the KDD-Cup 1999 
dataset, but this research uses the UNSW-NB15 dataset, which 
better reflects modern network traffic. Third, this research 
moves from the detection of attacks in individual network events 
and develops a level of cyber situation awareness. This allows 
human analysts to rapidly identify the computer systems 
involved in attacks and to take action on this systems to contain 
and eradicate the compromises. 
The remainder of this paper provides background 
information on related work in intrusion detection, cyber 
situation awareness, and active learning. Next, it describes the 
two experiments conducted for this research and the results of 
each. After this, it reviews the results, implications, limitations, 
and potential for future research. 
II. RELATED WORK 
A. Intrusion Detection 
Intrusion detection identifies cyberattacks in computer 
systems and networks [5,6]
access to or modification of files, user information, network 
data, or system resources [7]. Signature-based intrusion 
detection matches computer or network information to known 
patterns that represent cyberattacks [8]. Anomaly-based 
intrusion detection identifies abnormalities in computer systems 
or network packets to point to potential attacks [8]. Intrusion 
detection is commonly categorized as either network-based or 
host-based, although these can be further subdivided [9]. 
Machine learning approaches are commonly used in 
intrusion detection. Examples include: symbolist approaches 
that use decision trees and random forests [4];  connectionist 
approaches that use neural networks [10-12]; evolutionary 
approaches that mimic genetics or the immune system [13]; 
Bayesian methods [14]; and analogistic approaches that use 
support vector machines [15]. 
Accuracy is one of the most common methods for evaluating 
intrusion detection systems. Using a confusion matrix as in 
Figure 1 accuracy can be defined as all of the true positive and 
true negative outcomes divided by all possible outcomes: 
accuracy=
TP	+	TN
TP	+	FP	+	TN	+	FN (1) 
  
Intrusion detection research frequently focuses on false 
positive reduction [16]. This is especially important because of 
the highly imbalanced nature of intrusion detection data, since 
attacks are rare in vast amounts of data [17]. As a result, even a 
highly accurate intrusion detection system may have high false 
positive rates [18]. To address this problem, intrusion detection 
algorithms are commonly over-trained, making them useful only 
for detecting known attacks and ignoring novel attacks [1]. 
More important to this research, intrusion detection requires 
repetitive work for humans to analyze and prioritize alerts, 
which results in fatigue and bad decisions [3]. Intrusion alerts 
are generally incomplete, leading to uncertainty, which 
increases the likelihood of bad decisions. As a result, it is 
important not only provide alerts for discrete events, but also to 
develop the context of those alerts to support improved decision-
making [19]. 
B. Cyber Situation Awareness 
Situation awareness is a theory that was introduced to create 
a model for how understanding can be developed [20]. By 
beginning with discrete events or observations, an 
understanding of the current situation can be developed. Three 
levels of situation awareness are commonly used, as depicted in 
Figure 2: 1) observation of elements of the current situation; 2) 
comprehension of the observations to understand the current 
situation; and 3) projection of a future state. Although situation 
awareness has a wide variety of applications, it has been 
specifically applied to decision-making for security analysts 
[21]. 
Theories of cyber situation awareness have been developed 
using cognitive task analysis to understand the day-to-day 
practices of security analysts [2,21]. These studies have found 
that because of the large amounts of data and uncertain 
information, analysts rely on their own memory of past incidents 
and make biased decisions. Intrusion detection research has 
focused on the observation of discrete events, but it has not 
provided support for moving from uncertainty to help analysts 
to develop an understanding of the situation [22]. 
C. Active Learning 
Active learning is a machine learning approach that focuses 
on interacting with human experts to label unlabeled data 
efficiently. The machine learning algorithm selects a sample of 
records and presents them to the human expert, who is referred 
to as an oracle [23]. The sample of records is presented to the 
oracle, which is called a query. A variety of strategies for 
optimal queries to human experts has been developed to 
minimize the number of queries to the oracle and still accurately 
label a dataset. Initial approaches applied set theory, including 
membership, equivalence, subset, supersets, disjointness, and 
exhaustiveness [24].  Other approaches have successfully used 
statistical methods and neural networks [25]. Still others have 
applied greedy search, opportunistic priors, and Bayesian 
assumptions [26]. More recent research has found the value in 
uncertainty sampling [27] as well as using clustering to create a 
more diverse sample [4]. 
Active learning has been found to be effective in adversarial 
environments, since it adapts based on human feedback [27]. 
This research builds upon prior work that applied active learning 
 
 
Fig. 1.    Confusion matrix 
 
 
Fig. 2    Levels of cyber situation awareness 
to intrusion detection to label a large imbalanced dataset while 
minimizing human interaction [4]. 
 
III. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS 
This research conducted of two experiments. The first was 
to evaluate approaches for sampling the data to find the most 
effective query for the oracle. The second was to develop cyber 
situation awareness from event-level detection of cyberattacks 
to predict the probability that a computer system was part of an 
attack. The experiments in this research were implemented using 
Python. This section describes the experiments and their results. 
A. Experiment 1 – Sampling Method Evaluation 
1) Design 
Using the first dataset of the UNSW-NB15 intrusion data 
[28], the first experiment sought to find a sampling approach that 
minimized the number of queries to the oracle. Having a diverse 
sample that included normal and attack records was important, 
since the results of this query would then be used to train a 
Random Forest classifier. The absence of attack records in the 
sample would make the training of the classifier of little value.  
The three approaches for sampling applied were random 
selection, k-means clustering of all of the features, and k-means 
clustering with bagging. Given the input records, X	=	{x1,	
x2,…xn}. The goal of the selection was to find a sample, T, such 
that T	Î	X that maximized diversity by including a mixture of 
normal and attack records. After selecting the sample, 𝑇, this set 
was presented to the Random Forest classifier to label the entire 
dataset. Thus, rf(X)	=	Y , where Y is the set of labels 
corresponding to X, such that Y	=	{y1	,y2	,…	yn} . The labels 
consisted of yn	∈	{0,	1}, such that 0 represented a normal record 
and 1 represented an attack.  
Figure 3 shows the algorithm used for this experiment. The 
number of runs for this experiment was set to 30. The 
ActiveLearner class implemented each of the three sampling 
methods. The while loop was to ensure that none of the samples 
returned only normal records. For testing the minimum attack 
labels was set to one. 
The dataset was loaded into a Pandas DataFrame. The 
random selection sampling method used the built-in sampling 
available in DataFrames to select 40 samples. The k-means 
clustering sampling used all features from the DataFrame and 
applied the sklearn k-means algorithm to create 40 clusters. One 
random sample was then taken from each cluster. Finally, the k-
means clustering with bagging sampling method randomly 
selected between 20 and 35 features and used the k-means 
clustering algorithm to create a random number for clusters 
ranging from 30 to 50.  
After selection of the samples using each of the three 
methods, the samples were used to query the oracle for labeling. 
Since the UNSW-NB15 dataset contains labels, a human analyst 
was not required to label the records. Instead this was 
implemented in software. Using the set of 30 to 50 labeled 
records provided by the oracle, this experiment proceeded to 
train a Random Forest classifier. Using the trained classifier, the 
entire dataset was classified. The results of the classification 
were used to evaluate each of the sampling methods. 
2) Results 
Using the labels identified by the Random Forest classifier, 
the accuracy, sensitivity, and false positive rates were evaluated. 
Since each approach included a degree of randomness, each of 
the three sampling methods was tested 30 times to ensure the 
results were reproduceable. Table I shows a summary of the 
results. Each sampling method obtained an average accuracy of 
greater than 97%. This is not surprising, since the UNSW-NB15 
dataset is highly imbalanced. What was surprising was that each 
had a similar sensitivity, or true positive rate of over 30%. This 
was surprising because it indicated that each method may be 
similarly capable of identifying a mixture of normal and attack 
records. Each method also had similar false positive rates of 
0.3% and 0.4%.  
TABLE I.  AVERAGES SAMPLING METHOD RESULTS OVER 10 RUNS 
Sampling Accuracy (%) Sensitivity (%) 
False Positive 
Rate (%) 
Random 97.5 34.1 0.4% 
k-Means 97.7 37.1 0.3% 
k-Means with 
Bagging 97.6 32.5 0.3% 
 
Where the sampling methods showed differences was in 
their variation. Figure 4 shows the distribution of results for 
accuracy, sensitivity, and false positive rates, respectively. 
Variations in accuracy for the bagging method provided some 
results as high as 99.1%. More important, variations in 
sensitivity for bagging resulted in true positive rates as high as 
96.2%. Bagging also showed a larger portion of low false 
positive rates than random sampling or k-means clustering 
selection. Although any of the three algorithms were found to be 
suitable for active learning, k-means with bagging was selected 
for the remainder of this research because the wide variation 
provided a more diverse set of observations for predicting the 
probability that a computer system was involved in an attack. 
Since the bagging method was selected for the remainder of 
this research, it is important to note its average sensitivity, or 
Initialize configurable variables 
for i = 0 to number of runs do 
 Instantiate ActiveLearner 
 while count of attacks < minimum attack labels 
  Create sample using selected method 
  Query the oracle with the sample for labeling 
 Train the Random Forest classifier using sample labels 
 Classify the entire dataset 
 Evaluate results of classification 
end for 
Fig. 3.    Algorithm for experiment 1 
true positive rate, of 32.5%. This will be used as the probability 
for the Bernoulli trials in the second experiment. 
B. Experiment 2 – Cyber Situation Awareness 
1) Design 
The second experiment used the observations, which were 
the detected attacks, from the first experiment to evaluate the 
probability that a computer system was part of an attack. 
Bernoulli trials were used to combine the observations to 
determine if each computer system was involved in an attack. A 
Bernoulli trial was appropriate for calculating the cumulative 
probability, since this experiment met the three conditions for 
using a such a trial. First, there were only two possible outcomes, 
in that the classifier only predicted normal and attack records. 
Second, each detection had a fixed probability, p, of being a 
successful detection of a normal attack. This was found in the 
previous experiment to be the sensitivity of 0.325. By extension, 
using the miss rate of 1 – sensitivity, yielded q = 0.675. Third, 
each trial was completely independent of all others. This 
condition was met, since each run was based on a different active 
learning sample and the classifier for each run was trained 
separately. 
 Using the bagging method from the first experiment, the 
second experiment ran the active learning sequence 10 times. 
The active learning sequence included selecting a sample from 
the dataset, training the classifier using the sample, and 
classifying the entire dataset as the testing. Each of these 10 
sequences and results was considered a “run”. 
To implement this experiment, the detection results from 
each run were grouped by srcip, which was the feature in the 
dataset used to represent each computer system. Since each 
detection result was either a 0 for normal records or a 1 for a 
detected attack, the grouped results were summed to find the 
total number of attack outcomes. Thus, for each srcip the 
number of detected attacks, d, was: 𝑑 =4𝑌6 (2) 
The total number of trials, 𝑛, was the number of records, 
including both normal and attack, associated with each srcip.  
Thus, for each srcip, the probability that that computer system 
was part of an attack was: 𝑃(𝑑) = 	9𝑛𝑑: 𝑝6𝑞=>6 (3) 
To simulate how a human analyst might use this active 
learning solution, the results of each run built upon each other.  
As a result, the number of trials for a given run, 𝑟, was: 𝑛@ = 	4𝑛A@ABC  (4) 
The number of detections for a given run was similarly: 𝑑@ = 	4𝑑A@ABC  (5) 
Thus, the results of each run for P(d) reflected all the trials 
and all the detections leading up to the run. The algorithm to 
calculate P(d) was the same as the algorithm from the first 
experiment, but added the summation of n and d, as well as the 
calculation of P(d) for each srcip for each run. 
2) Results 
Each run of the active learning cycle provided a variety of 
detection results, and each had a degree of error. As a result, the 
first run yielded very low probabilities that any systems were 
involved in an attack. By the end of the second run, however, 
three of the four computer systems that were part of the attacks 
in the dataset were identified with a 100% probability. Of the 
remaining computer systems in the dataset 29 had probabilities 
of 0%, while the rest had probabilities of 70% or lower. By the 
end of the fourth run, all of the attacking computer systems had 
been identified with 100% probability, and the remaining 
computer systems had probabilities of less than 50%. The 
Appendix of this paper shows the results of each run. 
Figure 5 graphs the probability of each srcip being involved 
in an attack for each of the runs for only the attacking computers. 
       
 
Fig. 4 – Experiment 1 distribution of results 
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It is interesting to note that run seven detected few attacks and  
reduced the probabilities of two of the computer systems down 
to zero or near zero. This was to be expected because of the 
randomness associated with each run. By the next run, all four 
computer systems were predicted with 100% probability to be 
part of an attack. Figure 6 shows a similar view for three of the 
non-attacking computer systems that experienced a reduction in 
probability as the runs progressed. 
This experiment found that by requesting a human analyst to 
label an average of 40 records per run, after four runs, with 160 
labels manually identified, the computer systems involved in 
attacks could be identified accurately in a dataset of 700,001 
network events. At a more extreme case, if all 10 runs were 
required, the human analyst would only need to label 400 events. 
Using the list of computer systems that are involved in an attack, 
an analyst can move quickly into a course of action to contain 
and eradicate the compromise. 
C. Source Code and Detailed Results 
The source code used for these experiments as well as the 
detailed results are available for download at 
https://github.com/stevenmcelwee/alcsa. This will allow the 
results to be reproduced and expanded upon in future research. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
This research made four main contributions. First, it built 
upon a similar previous study [4] by using a more suitable 
dataset for intrusion detection research, the UNSW-NB15 
dataset. This made the research more relevant and practical for 
application. Second, it provided a more in-depth analysis of the 
selection of a sampling method for developing queries for the 
oracle. Although this study determined that the three sampling 
strategies provided similar results, it also provided additional 
criteria for evaluation by looking more closely at sensitivity, 
false positive rates, and variation in the results. Third, this study 
showed how making a few runs of active learning cycles, the 
probability that a computer system was involved in an attack 
could be calculated cumulatively with a high degree of accuracy. 
Fourth, this research demonstrated the value in moving the 
perspective of intrusion detection from event-level detection to 
evaluating the probability that a computer system was part of an 
attack. By doing so, this research demonstrated that by manually 
labeling between 160 and 400 records in the dataset, a human 
analyst could quickly determine the computer systems that 
require incident response activities. Thus, this solution 
addressed previous concerns about the volume of intrusion alerts 
and the fatigue associated with reviewing them. 
In addition, this research was novel in that it applied active 
learning to cyber situation awareness. It moved intrusion 
detection from the first level of situation awareness into level 
two, by aggregating alerts with cumulative probability. As a 
result, this research set the stage for future cyber situation 
awareness research that can further apply machine learning to 
predicting a future operational state and even taking a course of 
action. 
This research had three known limitations. First, because it 
used a single dataset for intrusion detection research, it may not 
apply to all intrusion datasets or to real network traffic. This 
research used an accepted dataset to reduce the impact of this 
limitation, but testing was not performed on live operational 
networks.  
Second, this research did not account for the limitations of 
human experts to provide the correct labels in the active learning 
cycle. Instead, the oracle in these experiments provided the 
correct label 100% of the time. The impact of this limitation is 
reduced because the results are used to train a Random Forest 
classifier, which introduced some error. This classifier was 
chosen because it is less prone to overfitting. As a result, it was 
expected that a noisy oracle would not introduce a significant 
change in these results. 
Third, this research was limited in that the solution only 
supports off-line analysis. Although the algorithms used in this 
research ran quickly on the test dataset, real operational network 
data is significantly more voluminous and takes longer to 
process. As a result, the results of this research are best suited 
for off-line analysis and incident response, rather than early 
detection of attacks in progress. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Intrusion detection research has focused primarily on event-
level detection, which experiences problems because of large 
volumes of data, highly imbalanced datasets, and human fatigue. 
 
Fig. 5.    P(d) for attacking srcip computers for rounds 1 through 10 
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Fig. 6.    P(d) for non-attacking srcip computers for rounds 1 through 10 
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This research addressed these problems by using cyber situation 
awareness to shift the focus from the event-level to the computer 
system level. The experiments in this research showed that 
active learning using k-means clustering with bagging was 
effective in providing a diverse sample to the oracle. They also 
showed that by aggregating the event-level detection results to 
the computer system level, a Bernoulli trial was effective in 
calculating the probability that a computer system was part of an 
attack. The results showed that with minimal human interaction 
to label the samples, the solution provided highly accurate 
results that could allow a human analyst to more quickly 
comprehend the current situation and to take action to contain 
and eradicate cyberattacks. 
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APPENDIX – RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT TWO PROBABILITY BY SRCIP 
 
   Run, P(d) 
srcip Type n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
59.166.0.2 normal 67,209 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
59.166.0.0 normal 67,128 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
59.166.0.5 normal 67,091 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
59.166.0.4 normal 66,722 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
59.166.0.1 normal 66,587 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
59.166.0.3 normal 66,145 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
59.166.0.6 normal 64,689 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
59.166.0.8 normal 64,640 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
59.166.0.9 normal 64,187 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
59.166.0.7 normal 63,725 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
175.45.176.1 attack 14,325 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
149.171.126.18 normal 6,010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
175.45.176.3 attack 5,128 0.000 1.000 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.988 1.000 1.000 1.000 
175.45.176.0 attack 4,782 0.000 1.000 0.939 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.038 1.000 1.000 1.000 
175.45.176.2 attack 3,236 0.000 1.000 0.240 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
10.40.85.1 normal 1,680 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
10.40.182.1 normal 1,670 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
10.40.85.30 normal 888 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
10.40.170.2 normal 874 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
10.40.182.3 normal 874 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
149.171.126.1 normal 251 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
149.171.126.5 normal 249 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
149.171.126.6 normal 241 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
149.171.126.2 normal 232 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
149.171.126.3 normal 231 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
149.171.126.4 normal 225 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
149.171.126.9 normal 217 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
149.171.126.8 normal 217 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
149.171.126.7 normal 207 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
149.171.126.0 normal 192 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
192.168.241.243 normal 108 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
149.171.126.11 normal 16 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
149.171.126.15 normal 8 0.043 0.184 0.024 0.066 0.011 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 
149.171.126.16 normal 6 0.095 0.009 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
149.171.126.19 normal 3 0.308 0.095 0.029 0.009 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
149.171.126.10 normal 3 0.308 0.697 0.398 0.417 0.431 0.442 0.275 0.292 0.465 0.320 
149.171.126.12 normal 2 0.456 0.208 0.095 0.043 0.020 0.009 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.000 
127.0.0.1 normal 1 0.675 0.456 0.308 0.208 0.140 0.095 0.064 0.043 0.029 0.020 
149.171.126.13 normal 1 0.675 0.456 0.308 0.208 0.140 0.095 0.064 0.043 0.029 0.020 
149.171.126.17 normal 1 0.675 0.456 0.308 0.208 0.140 0.095 0.064 0.043 0.029 0.020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
